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Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government 
borrowing. Using a sample of 43 countries over the period 1982–2000, this paper 
provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints 
for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional 
arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific 
arrangements depends on other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree 
of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality 
of fiscal reporting. [JEL H74, H77]
O
ver the past few decades, countries around the world have gradually moved 
toward the greater decentralization of fiscal revenue and spending responsi-
bilities. As a result, subnational economic policies have taken an increasingly impor-
tant role in ensuring macroeconomic stability. National governments have adopted 
different institutional responses to the difficulties of decentralized decision making, 
especially addressing the need to improve policy coordination across levels of gov-
ernment and contain subnational borrowing.
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Various case studies have identified different approaches to controlling sub-
national borrowing, but none has indicated which institutional arrangement is the 
most successful. Furthermore, only a few papers have conducted cross-country 
empirical analysis, and even these few focused on the presence of borrowing con-
straints rather than on their specific design.
This paper attempts to bridge the gap with a cross-country analysis of a large 
sample of countries. It focuses on the impact on subnational budget deficits of dif-
ferent approaches to controlling subnational government borrowing, and attempts 
to identify the determinants of the effectiveness of each institutional arrangement.
I.  Institutional Framework
Sources of Subnational Fiscal Indiscipline
Wildasin (2004) argues that if intergovernmental transfers are costless and borrow-
ing costs are the same across all tiers of government, the intergovernmental struc-
ture of borrowing does not matter. However, there are several reasons to believe that 
intergovernmental transfers do cost, and that subnational governments may be more 
inclined to overspend, undertax, and borrow excessively than national governments. 
These reasons may arise from the common pool problem, soft budget constraints, 
interregional competition, unfunded federal mandates, or short electoral cycles.
Common pool
The common pool problem stems from the separation of the costs and benefits of 
public spending. If a public project benefits predominantly a particular jurisdiction 
but receives financing through a common pool of taxes from the whole country, the 
jurisdiction pays only a small fraction of the costs of the project while enjoying a 
large share of its benefits. The lack of full responsibility for the costs of a project 
results in excessive spending1 and creates a clear incentive for regions to compete 
for federal transfers that enable them to finance region-specific projects out of a 
common pool. This competition can take various forms. Ideally, regions would 
compete on the basis of the quality of their proposed spending projects. Less ide-
ally, they could signal that they are in particular need of federal assistance by run-
ning large budget deficits or accumulating unsustainable debts, and hope that central 
government grants would eventually bail them out.
Soft budget constraints
The possibility of a bailout does not stem from the existence of a common pool per 
se, but from the way it functions. When transfers are based on ex post financial 
needs rather than ex ante characteristics, the central government can bail out regions 
1See also Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981), who show that bargaining in a legislature comprised 
of regional representatives will lead to overprovision of spending programs with benefits concentrated in 
particular regions.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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experiencing financial difficulties. In this case, the budget constraint faced by the 
subnational government becomes “soft”: if regional authorities undercollect taxes, 
overspend, or default on the debt, they expect the federal government to cover the 
gap between actual and “affordable” expenditure. Moreover, lenders also lose incen-
tive to police regional governments because they view their investments as protected 
by a federal government guarantee.2
These problems would not exist if central governments could commit credibly 
to never revising transfer allocations ex post, that is, to a no-bailout policy. Although 
such a policy stance may be optimal in the long run, it is difficult to commit to in 
the short run, especially if it involves a painful local default or a reduction in the 
provision of basic public services—schools closed or pensions unpaid. Persson and 
Tabellini (1996) and Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001) show formally that 
a national government is likely to find it beneficial to bail out a financially dis-
tressed region to maximize the federation’s social welfare. In addition, a default by 
one region can increase the cost of borrowing for all other regions in a federation, 
so neighbor regions may be interested in providing the defaulting region with a 
bailout transfer.
Interregional competition
If regions actively compete for mobile capital and labor, their rivalry may reduce 
the overall tax burden and enhance fiscal discipline. At the same time, such compe-
tition may encourage regions to set inefficiently low tax rates or spend excessively 
on infrastructure projects financed by borrowing. Cai and Treisman (2004) suggest 
that if regional governments are in charge of only tax collection and cannot vary tax 
base or tax rates, they may have the incentive not to enforce tax collection on their 
territory, thus reducing the de facto tax burden in the region.
On the other hand, if regions share the same tax base with the federal govern-
ment, and both tiers of government have tax-setting powers, the equilibrium level 
of taxation is likely to be excessive because neither government fully internalizes 
the negative effect of raising tax rates on the tax base (Keen, 1998; and Keen and 
Kotsogiannis, 2002). Thus, inefficiencies at the subnational level may arise under 
different decentralization arrangements.
Unfunded federal mandates
In 1992, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court obliged the federal 
government to provide supplementary transfers (de facto bailouts) to the Länder of 
Saarland and Bremen (Wurzel, 1999). The court agreed that most of the expenditure 
of the distressed jurisdictions was mandated constitutionally, even though the fed-
eral funding allocated to the regions had been insufficient to finance the mandatory 
expenditure.
2For a more detailed discussion of soft budget constraints and their consequences, see Kornai, Maskin, 
and Roland (2003).hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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Such rulings create the sense that regional authorities are not responsible if 
federal mandates are initially incompatible with sustainable fiscal policies. This 
may result in a lack of incentive for sound public expenditure management at the 
regional level, widespread bailout expectations, and soft budget constraints for sub-
national governments. Moreover, voters will not hold subnational officials respon-
sible for disparities between revenue assignments and expenditure responsibilities, 
blaming the central government instead. Therefore, electoral accountability will no 
longer discipline subnational governments.
Short electoral cycles
If voters are unable to take into account the costs of public spending, governments 
can gain political credit by increasing spending or cutting taxes before the elections. 
Politicians with short planning horizons may not fully internalize the future costs 
of borrowing. Besley and Case (1995) empirically confirm that fiscal preferences 
of incumbents eligible for reelection differ from those of “lame ducks.” This factor 
is not unique to subnational governments; short political cycles undermine the cen-
tral government’s fiscal discipline as well.3
The Role of Vertical Fiscal Imbalances
Oates (1972) argued that decentralizing public spending leads to increased efficiency. 
Local governments can better assess the needs of local communities, match diverse 
preferences, and therefore allocate resources more efficiently than the central govern-
ment can. In addition, local governments also have the information necessary to select 
more cost-effective projects.
Decentralized spending, however, creates a gap between the subnational gov-
ernments’ own revenue from local property taxes and their expenditure responsi-
bilities. This gap, filled by federal transfers from centralized tax revenues, is referred 
to as a vertical fiscal imbalance, usually measured as the ratio of transfers to total 
subnational government revenue.
Vertical fiscal imbalances tend to exacerbate the moral hazard and adverse 
incentives created by the common pool problem, soft budget constraints, and other 
factors discussed earlier, leading to poor subnational fiscal discipline and the need 
to control subnational borrowing. A high vertical fiscal imbalance implies a high 
proportion of regional spending financed from the common pool and soft budget 
constraints for subnational governments, if transfers serve the purpose of closing a 
subnational fiscal deficit regardless of the reasons underlying the mismatch between 
subnational government revenue and expenditure. Moreover, subnational govern-
ments with high vertical fiscal imbalances can argue that the central government is 
to blame for subnational budget deficits or failure to repay subnational debt. Even 
tax competition can take more distortionary forms in the presence of high vertical 
fiscal imbalances: Cai and Treisman (2004) present several cases from China, 
3See Alesina and Perotti (1995) for empirical evidence and discussion.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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Russia, and the United States where regional authorities have tried to attract private 
investment by protecting local enterprises from federal tax collectors.
Classification of Controls
Faced with these challenges, countries have adopted various institutional approaches 
to  contain  subnational  borrowing.  Following Ter-Minassian  (1997b),  these 
approaches have usually been grouped into four broad categories: market discipline, 
administrative constraints, rule-based controls, and cooperative arrangements.
Market discipline
Some countries rely on capital markets to contain subnational borrowing. In this 
case, the central government does not set any limits on subnational borrowing, and 
local governments are free to decide how much to borrow, from whom to borrow, 
and on what to spend the borrowed money. Subnational governments may also 
decide by themselves to adopt a fiscal rule in an attempt to enhance their credit 
standing in the market. Such self-imposed rules exist in Canada, Switzerland, and 
the United States.
As Lane (1993) points out, however, several conditions are necessary for finan-
cial markets to exert effective discipline over subnational borrowing. First, markets 
should be free and open, with no regulation on financial intermediaries that could 
place subnational governments in a privileged-borrower position (for example, 
portfolio composition requirements). Second, adequate information on the borrow-
er’s outstanding debt and repayment capacity should be available to potential lend-
ers. Third, there should be no perceived chance of a bailout by the central government 
in a case of impending default. Finally, the borrower should have institutions ensur-
ing adequate policy responsiveness to market signals.
Administrative constraints
In several countries, the central government is empowered with direct control over 
subnational borrowing. This control may take various forms, including the setting 
of annual (or more frequent) limits on the overall debt of individual subnational 
jurisdictions (as in Lithuania since 2001), special treatment or prohibition of exter-
nal borrowing (as in Mexico), review and authorization of individual borrowing 
operations (including approval of the terms and conditions, as in India or Bolivia), 
or the centralization of all government borrowing with on-lending to subnational 
governments (as in Latvia and Indonesia).
Administrative procedures introduce strict controls over subnational borrowing 
while preserving a flexible fiscal policy. They also ensure some coordination of the 
country’s external borrowing, closely linking it to other macroeconomic policies. 
However, the implied approval of individual spending and borrowing initiatives   
of subnational governments by the central government introduces an explicit or 
implicit guarantee of local and regional public debt. Having granted permission, the 
federal government may find it more difficult to refuse a bailout later on, should the 
regional government run into trouble.hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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Imperfect information on local investment projects and local needs introduces 
a further drawback. Although subnational governments can potentially select the 
most necessary and cost-efficient spending programs, central authorities lacking 
the necessary information will select only “average” quality ones. Moreover, per-
ceiving their borrowing as guaranteed by the central government, local administra-
tions may be inclined to submit any project for central government approval, 
regardless of its quality and risk, because in the worst case, the losses will be cov-
ered out of the common resource pool.
Rule-based controls
The central government can also try to contain subnational borrowing by imposing 
a fiscal rule. Both federal and unitary states have relied on standing rules specified 
in the constitution or in laws to control subnational borrowing, in an effort to confer 
credibility on the conduct of macroeconomic policies. Such rules introduce a con-
straint on fiscal policy to guarantee that fundamentals will remain predictable and 
robust regardless of the government in charge. Rules may take the form of restric-
tions on overall budget deficits (Austria, Spain), operating budget deficits (Norway), 
indicators of debt-servicing capacity (Spain, Japan, Brazil, Korea), level of accu-
mulated subnational debt (Hungary), or level of spending (Belgium, Germany). 
Alternatively, “golden rules” establish no ceilings, but limit borrowing to invest-
ment purposes (Germany).
Fiscal rules are attractive because they may be clear, transparent, and relatively 
easy to monitor. Easily understood by economic agents, rules may also improve the 
credibility of fiscal policy. The main disadvantage of the rule-based approach is a 
subtle trade-off between ensuring compliance and preserving flexibility. Strict fis-
cal rules with universal coverage leave little room for maneuver in case of unex-
pected economic downturns, whereas flexible fiscal rules with escape clauses lack 
credibility and fail to impose sufficient discipline when they are easy to circumvent 
in practice.
Furthermore, if restrictions apply only to current balances, expenditure can be 
reclassified from current to capital (see case studies in Ter-Minassian, 1997b). If 
restrictions do not apply to off-budget items or semigovernmental organizations 
(such as enterprises owned by local governments), debt can quickly accumulate off 
budget. For example, when Australia relaxed restrictions on the finances of sub-
national semigovernmental authorities in 1982, the debt of regional public enter-
prises tripled over the next two years, and the decision was eventually reversed in 
1984 (Craig, 1997).
In Denmark and Hungary, local governments used sale-and-lease-back opera-
tions to circumvent borrowing restrictions, forcing the Danish central government to 
revise the definition of borrowing to include renting and leasing arrangements (Jørgen 
and Pedersen, 2002). Local governments in the United States earlier exploited lease-
arrangement schemes (Granof, 1984). Ahmad, Singh, and Fortuna (2004) argue that 
even in China, where regional governments must run balanced budgets and generally 
cannot borrow, provincial authorities managed to accumulate substantial “hidden” 
off-budget debts.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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Cooperative arrangements
Under the cooperative approach, variations of which exist in several European 
countries and Australia, a negotiation process between the federal and the lower 
levels of government designs subnational borrowing controls. Subnational govern-
ments are actively involved in formulating macroeconomic objectives and the key 
fiscal parameters underpinning these objectives, thus becoming jointly responsible 
for their achievement. This process leads to an agreement on the overall deficit 
targets for the general government, as well as on the main items of revenue and 
expenditure. Specific limits are then agreed upon for the financing requirements of 
individual subnational jurisdictions.
In Australia, a loan council coordinating the fiscal policies and borrowing deci-
sions of Australian states was set up in 1929. The council currently comprises trea-
surers or heads of government of each state and the commonwealth treasurer, who 
presides over deliberations. The council is in charge of analyzing and approving 
financing requirements of each state and of the commonwealth as a whole, as well 
as monitoring the execution of the decisions.
The main strength of the cooperative approach is that it combines many indi-
vidual advantages of the other three approaches. By promoting a dialogue between 
the tiers of government, it has the potential to ensure the coordination of macro-
economic policy while retaining sufficient flexibility. It raises awareness among 
subnational governments of the macroeconomic implications of their budgetary 
choices. Finally, it does not automatically imply a central government guarantee for 
subnational borrowing.
However, its hybrid nature is also its main weakness. When poorly implemented, 
cooperative arrangements produce the flaws of other approaches, instead of their 
advantages. They may undermine the leadership of the central government, soften 
subnational government budget constraints, promote bargaining for federal trans-
fers, and hamper policy coordination. By trying to deal with all the challenges simul-
taneously, the cooperative approach may end up dealing effectively with none.
Empirical Evidence
What has the evidence been up to now? After reviewing several case studies, Ter-
Minassian and Craig (1997) were the first to classify subnational borrowing con-
straints. They recognize that reliance solely on market discipline for containing 
subnational borrowing is not likely to be successful. More generally, they suggest 
that a rule-based approach to controlling debt appears to be preferable to adminis-
trative controls in terms of transparency and certainty. They also suggest that coop-
erative arrangements could be a promising new development to involve subnational 
governments in formulating and implementing medium-term fiscal adjustment pro-
grams, thus encouraging budgetary responsibility.
Ter-Minassian, Albino-War, and Singh (2004) arrive at similar conclusions by 
examining differences in average subnational fiscal outcomes in 15 countries hav-
ing different subnational borrowing regimes. They conclude that self-imposed fis-
cal rules tend to be associated with better fiscal outcomes, reflecting a greater hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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subnational commitment to fiscal soundness. This approach worked best when 
there was little experience of bailouts. However, the analysis of simple averages 
does not control for numerous factors that affect subnational fiscal balances (for 
example, vertical fiscal imbalance) and thus needs to be refined.
Rodden and Eskeland (2003) summarize other case studies, emphasizing that 
either strong hierarchical oversight or strong market mechanisms must be in place 
to contain subnational borrowing effectively. In contrast, Rattsø (2002), reviewing 
the experience of European countries, notes that decentralized governments can 
achieve fiscal stability in different ways and concludes that all the countries consid-
ered have been successful in avoiding serious fiscal imbalances.
The econometric evidence of the impact of borrowing constraints on subnational 
fiscal policy has been, so far, limited and mixed. In a sample of 30 countries, von 
Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) observe that the introduction of borrowing con-
straints increases subnational indebtedness. However, this dependence may not be 
causal; their regression does not control for factors other than GDP. Fornasari, 
Webb, and Zou (2000) found that constraining subnational borrowing did not seem 
to have any consistent effect on subnational fiscal deficits in a panel of 31 countries. 
Jin and Zou (2002) found similar results in 32 countries for the size of subnational 
governments. In contrast, Rodden (2002), using panel data on 33 countries, con-
cluded that the largest deficits are run by subnational governments that rely heavily 
on federal transfers and at the same time are free to borrow.
The methodology of the studies has evolved over time. Whereas von Hagen and 
Eichengreen (1996); Fornasari, Webb, and Zou (2000); and Jin and Zou (2002) used 
a dummy for the presence of controls, Rodden (2002) used a quasi-continuous 
index to reflect the degree of borrowing autonomy. This index, initially suggested 
by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 1997), is a rational number 
between 1 and 5; it takes into account institutional features, such as whether every 
new debt requires explicit authorization by the upper-tier government, whether for-
mal limits are in place, and whether subnational governments own banks and public 
enterprises. A major advantage of this approach is its ability to compress informa-
tion about subnational borrowing autonomy into a single index, preserving degrees 
of freedom for the statistical analysis. The disadvantage is that it focuses exclu-
sively on the impact of the degree of borrowing autonomy on fiscal outcomes and 
cannot show the types of borrowing constraints that perform better. In other words, 
it confirms that subnational borrowing should be controlled (at least in the countries 
with high vertical fiscal imbalances), but cannot suggest how.
II.  Empirical Analysis
Data
This paper tries to assess whether the design of subnational borrowing controls 
leads to particular fiscal outcomes, measured as the aggregate subnational fiscal 
balance–to-revenue ratio. We focus on the long run, analyzing the impact of insti-
tutional features and federal arrangements on average long-run subnational and 
consolidated fiscal balances.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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This paper uses a newly collected data set on the subnational borrowing regimes 
and fiscal outcomes of 43 countries (industrial and emerging, federal and unitary) 
in the period 1982–2000. The data come mostly from the IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS).4 Unless otherwise indicated, the first level of subnational govern-
ment provides the data for each country.5
We classified all countries according to the design of their subnational borrow-
ing controls (see Table 1) and identified regime changes, if any. If countries changed 
their subnational borrowing regime during the period for which data are available 
(for example, Germany or Hungary), we included them in two different cross- 
sectional units so that each subperiod (before the regime change and after the regime 
change) could provide an unambiguous measure of subnational borrowing controls. 
For countries using several institutional features simultaneously, the classification 
has tried to emphasize the predominant approach, even though the institutional 
framework governing intergovernmental fiscal relations is complex and the group-
ing of countries may not always be clear cut (details are presented in Appendix 
Table A.1). Moreover, because of data constraints, the constructed panel is unbal-
anced, and fewer countries represent certain specifications.
In addition to borrowing regimes, we identified bailout precedents, as a proxy for 
enforcement of rules in practice. A country was considered to have a bailout history 
if significant bailouts of subnational governments had taken place in the past.6
4Individual data sources are listed in the Appendix. GFS data on transfers may not always be consistent 
across countries. In some cases, shared revenues are classified as transfers, whereas in others they are coded 
as the subnational government’s own revenue. There may thus be a problem measuring vertical fiscal imbal-
ances. However, comparing measures of this variable constructed using GFS and a number of other sources 
(IDB, 1997; and OECD, 1999 and 2000) revealed differences for only a few countries.
5If subnational government comprises multiple tiers, the first level refers to the provincial (regional, 
state) governments. The results do not change qualitatively if data on consolidated subnational government 
are used instead. However, consolidated data were not available for all countries.
6In principle, one should also take into account subnational governments’ access to implicit borrowing 
via government-controlled banks and enterprises. Unfortunately, such data were not available for many 
countries in the sample.
Table 1.  Subnational Borrowing Controls: Summary
(Number of observations)
        With   Without 
        Bailout    Bailout 
Regime  Total  Emerging  Industrial  History   History
Unrestricted  13    5    8    6    7
Self-imposed rules    3    1    2    1    2
Centrally imposed rules  12    6    6    6    6
Administrative  14  12    2    7    7
Cooperative    8    2    6    4    4
Total  50  26  24  24  26
Sources: See Appendix.hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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Control Variables
Numerous factors indirectly related to the design of subnational borrowing constraints 
may also affect subnational fiscal balances and thus need to be controlled for.
1.  Degree of fiscal decentralization: A higher degree of fiscal decentralization 
(proxied by the share of subnational government expenditure in general govern-
ment expenditure) can lead to inferior fiscal outcomes because it hampers mac-
roeconomic coordination, or it may reflect the central government’s attempt to 
shift part of the fiscal burden onto subnational governments.
2.  Common standards of public expenditure management: Common standards for sub-
national governments’ budgeting and financial reporting facilitate the monitoring of 
their budget execution, making the enforcement of rules more effective. Von Hagen 
and Harden (1994) and Poterba and von Hagen (1999) confirmed that transparent 
budget procedures contributed to improving fiscal discipline in the 1980s and early 
1990s. This study uses a dummy variable for the presence of common standards.
3.  Governance features:
•  Corruption (measured using a survey-based perception index) may have an (indi-
rect) negative effect on subnational fiscal discipline, insofar as it is associated 
with weak fiscal institutions.
•  Central bank independence (measured by Cukierman’s (1992) index) imposes a 
harder budget constraint on all levels of government and may improve fiscal 
outcomes.
4.  Cost of debt service: Lower real interest rates, higher inflation, and lower debt-service 
spending (measured by the ratio of debt-servicing expenditure to gross national 
income) make borrowing cheaper and thus may encourage higher budget deficits.
5.  Political variables:
•  A dummy variable for parliamentary democracies: Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
found evidence of significant differences in the fiscal behavior of governments in 
presidential and parliamentary democracies.
•  A dummy variable for regional representation in the upper chamber of parlia-
ment: Rodden (2002) pointed out that an upper chamber of parliament composed 
of regional representatives increased the veto power of the regions, negatively 
affecting fiscal discipline.
•  The Herfindahl index of political fractionalization: Rodden (2002) found that 
political cohesion contributed to improving subnational fiscal outcomes.
•  A dummy variable for elected subnational authorities: Elected subnational 
authorities may have less fiscal discipline because of short-term electoral objec-
tives requiring increases in spending.
•  The index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (showing the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnolinguistic groups): In 
more fractionalized countries, the autonomy and bargaining power of ethnic 
regions may be higher, undermining the central government’s ability to impose 
fiscal discipline throughout the country.
6.  Demographic variables:
•  Population density: Lower population density can put additional pressure on sub-
national governments because the provision of public goods is, on average, more 
costly than in densely populated areas.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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•  Dependency ratio (the share of population below the age of 15 or above the age 
of 64): A higher dependency ratio also could put additional fiscal pressure on 
subnational governments, because the young and the elderly consume a dispro-
portionately large share of public goods and services and receive a larger share 
of social transfers.
7.  Development variables: GDP per capita and a dummy distinguishing emerging 
markets from industrial economies take into account the better fiscal positions 
and institutions of developed countries.
8.  Size variables:
•  Size of general government: The ratio of government expenditure to GDP may 
influence fiscal balances, because larger governments may find it harder to bal-
ance their budgets.
•  Area: Rodden (2002) reported that larger countries (in terms of area) run higher 
fiscal surpluses, on average.
9.  Federal structure:
•  A federation dummy, because a federal structure may increase the bargaining 
power of the regions, undermining fiscal discipline.
•  The average size of subnational jurisdictions (measured by the average subna-
tional government expenditure-to-GDP ratio), because large jurisdictions may 
find it easier to borrow and are more likely to undertake large-scale investment 
projects requiring outside sources of financing.
•  Horizontal imbalances (interregional disparities in per capita income and budget 
expenditure) calling for equalization programs that result in a higher reliance on 
federal transfers.7
General Approach
This section examines the long-term effects of controlling subnational borrowing. 
Subnational borrowing controls aim at addressing the problem of subnational fiscal 
indiscipline. Because these problems are deeper when vertical fiscal imbalances are 
larger (as discussed in Section I), the marginal effect of subnational borrowing 
controls is expected to be larger under high vertical fiscal imbalances.8 To capture 
this possibility, we assume such marginal effects depend on the degree of vertical 
fiscal imbalance according to the following linear parametric form:
α α α ij j j i vfi = + 0 1 1 * , ( )
where vfii is the vertical fiscal imbalance in country i and α0j is the component of 
the marginal effect of approach j (for example, cooperative arrangements) that does 
not depend on the vertical fiscal imbalance.
7Because of data constraints, the impact of horizontal imbalances on fiscal outcomes could not be 
estimated.
8To give an example, suppose that a certain rule can achieve a balanced budget for subnational govern-
ment. Then its marginal effect on subnational fiscal balance will equal 10 percent if the average deficit had 
previously been 10 percent, and only 2 percent if the initial deficit averaged 2 percent.hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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The basic linear specification for subnational fiscal balances, as shown in equa-
tion (2), is similar to that used by Rodden (2002). In addition, it includes a dummy 
variable for bailout history (bailout), dummy variables for each subnational bor-
rowing regime, and interaction terms for the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance 
(vfiit) and each regime dummy. The sets of regime dummies and interaction terms 
together capture the marginal effects as modeled in equation (1):
SS self coop central ad it i i i = + + + + β α α α α 0 01 02 03 04 m mini it
i it i i
vfi






11 12 * * t t i it i it
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where countries are indexed by i and years by t; SS is the subnational government 
fiscal balance measured as the ratio of budget surplus to total revenue; self, coop, 
central, and admin are dummy variables for self-imposed rules, cooperative arrange-
ments, centrally imposed rules, and administrative controls, respectively; controls 
are the vector of control variables; and εit is the error term. The group of countries 
with no rules is chosen as a reference group for comparison.
Following Rodden (2002), the central government fiscal balance (measured as 
the ratio of central government surplus to total central government revenue and 
denoted as CS) is also included for several reasons. First, the average fiscal balance 
of the central government is a proxy for a society’s general preference for sustain-
able fiscal policy. Second, for countries where subnational government data are 
available only for a few years, the average fiscal balance of the central government 
captures possible business cycle effects. Third, the variable partly absorbs the 
effects of severe financial crises that affect average fiscal performance.
Because the focus of the long-term analysis is on average subnational outcomes, 
equation (2) was estimated using the “between” panel estimator that exploits cross-
sectional differences between the time averages of variables for every country.
Results
The results appear in column 1 of Table 2. Consistent with our prior expectations, 
the presence of a bailout history is associated with a statistically significant weaker 
subnational fiscal performance (3.7 percentage points higher subnational budget 
deficits9). Subnational governments also tend to be more disciplined in countries 
with more disciplined central governments; however, the level of decentralization 
as such does not seem to have any significant long-term effect on subnational gov-
ernment discipline.10
Concerning subnational borrowing constraints, self-imposed fiscal rules seem 
to perform better than centrally imposed rules, but only with low vertical fiscal 
9All marginal effects are measured in percentage points of total subnational government revenue.
10To preserve degrees of freedom and to avoid possible multicollinearity, additional controls were omit-
ted unless statistically significant. Appendix Table A.2 summarizes the evidence on the impact of additional 
controls.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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Table 2.  Determinants of Subnational Fiscal Balances
Model  1  2  3  4 
      Common   Emerging  
(Equation 2)  Linear  IV  Standards  Countries
Method  Between  Two-stage  Between
Dependent variable  Subnational surplus to revenue
Central government surplus (CS)  0.478  0.619  0.497  0.482
  (0.102)***  (0.351)*  (0.127)***  (0.095)***
Decentralization (dec)  −0.003  0.093  0.024  0.025
  (0.078)  (0.402)  (0.098)  (0.073)
Self-imposed rule (self)  0.040      0.063
  (0.145)      (0.136)
Centrally imposed rule (central)  −0.078  −0.026  −0.079  −0.109
  (0.045)*  (0.438)  (0.049)  (0.043)**
Cooperative (coop)  −0.155  0.214  −0.163  −0.162
  (0.064)**  (0.312)  (0.059)**  (0.060)***
Administrative (admin)  0.003  0.220  −0.025  0.013
  (0.042)  (0.311)  (0.050)  (0.039)
VFI * self  −0.314      −0.439
  (0.614)      (0.575)
VFI * central  0.206  0.467  0.188  0.197
  (0.098)**  (0.492)  (0.099)*  (0.092)**
VFI * coop  0.213  −0.412  −0.012  0.221
  (0.108)*  (0.684)  (0.150)  (0.101)**
VFI * admin  0.0003  −0.006  0.050  0.001
  (0.073)  (0.165)  (0.087)  (0.068)
Common standards of PEM      0.179
* coop      (0.071)**
Common standards of PEM      0.024
* central      (0.047)
VFI * central * emerge        0.213
        (0.085)**
GDP (log, in US$, PPP terms)  0.030  0.045  0.018  0.036
  (0.017)*  (0.046)  (0.023)  (0.016)**
Size of government  −0.187  −0.14    −0.158
  (0.130)  (0.144)    (0.122)
Bailout history (bailout)  −0.037  −0.023  −0.017  −0.043
  (0.020)*  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.018)**
Constant  −0.166  −0.455  −0.092  −0.234
  (0.133)  (0.559)  (0.200)  (0.127)
Number of observations  572  523  425  572
Number of groups  50  47  35  52
R2 (between)  0.63  0.57  0.8  0.69
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at the 10 percent level are 
marked with *; at the 5 percent level, with **; at the 1 percent level, with ***. VFI is vertical fis-
cal imbalance; PEM is public expenditure management; PPP is purchasing power parity; Emerge 
is emerging market dummy. The first-stage results of the two-stage IV procedure are presented in 
Appendix Table A.3.imbalances.11 The marginal effect of rules imposed on subnational borrowing by 
the central government and the effect of cooperative arrangements tend to increase 
rapidly as vertical fiscal imbalances widen (because the positive coefficients on the 
interaction terms are relatively large and statistically significant). The coefficient 
on the interaction term for the administrative approach is also positive, but rela-
tively small and statistically insignificant, reflecting the possibility that administra-
tive rules fail to solve the problem of soft budget constraints in the long run.
Figure 1 plots the marginal effects of the different borrowing regimes on sub-
national fiscal outcomes for different levels of vertical fiscal imbalance.12 The fact 
that centrally imposed rules and cooperative arrangements appear to be harmful 
when vertical fiscal imbalances are at zero should not be misinterpreted: zero verti-
cal fiscal imbalances simply do not exist. The area where self-imposed rules appear 
to be optimal (at vertical fiscal imbalances below 11 percent) includes only 3 coun-
tries, but the area where centrally imposed fiscal rules perform best of all (at verti-
cal fiscal imbalances above 40 percent) covers 22 countries. Administrative controls 
seem to be superior between these two thresholds, whereas cooperative arrange-
ments and unrestricted borrowing never outperform these alternative institutional 
frameworks.13
11However, the standard error of the corresponding coefficient is high because only three countries in 
the sample are characterized by self-imposed rules.
12The vertical axis crosses the horizontal one at the mean level of vertical fiscal imbalance. The hori-
zontal axis corresponds to the case of unrestricted subnational borrowing.
13All these conclusions should be viewed as tentative, because standard errors of the marginal effects 
of subnational borrowing controls are large, with confidence areas of the lines shown in Figure 1 overlap-
ping in most cases. For instance, the positive marginal effect of centrally imposed rules is statistically sig-
nificant at the 10 percent level only if vertical fiscal imbalance exceeds 70 percent. The 95 percent confidence 
interval for the marginal effect of centrally imposed rules at the 50 percent level of vertical fiscal imbalance 
is [−0.028; 0.078]. To avoid overloading Figure 1 with details, confidence intervals are not shown.



































Figure 1.  Marginal Effect of Different Subnational Borrowing Controls  
on Average Subnational Fiscal BalanceAlexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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To examine the impact of common financial reporting and budgeting standards on 
the effectiveness of subnational borrowing controls, equation (2) was augmented with 
interaction terms between the dummy for common standards of public expenditure 
management and dummies for the different subnational borrowing regimes.14 The 
results reported in column 3 of Table 2 show that the success of cooperative arrange-
ments depends on the presence of common standards in financial reporting. (The posi-
tive coefficient on the interaction term is large and statistically significant.)
Soft budget constraints and common pool problems affect local finances in all 
countries. However, in emerging economies that tend to have weaker institutions, 
fiscal discipline at the subnational level may also be weaker. At first glance, the aver-
age subnational fiscal balance in the subsample of industrial countries is −2.3 percent, 
compared with −4.2 percent in the subsample of emerging economies. Therefore, 
given this initial difference in fiscal problems, the marginal effect of introducing 
restrictions on subnational borrowing could be high in emerging economies, espe-
cially in those with high vertical fiscal imbalances.
Testing this hypothesis is difficult, however, because emerging economies more 
often adopt administrative rules, whereas industrial countries almost exclusively 
utilize cooperative arrangements. Thus, a differential effect of subnational borrow-
ing constraints in emerging and industrial countries can be tested only for centrally 
imposed fiscal rules (adopted by six emerging economies and six industrial coun-
tries in the sample). A positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interac-
tion term vfi*central*emerge added to equation (2) would provide evidence in 
support of the hypothesis (emerge being the emerging country dummy).
The results appear in column 4 of Table 2. Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of 
centrally imposed rules in industrial countries and emerging economies against the 
degree of vertical fiscal imbalances. The results show that in emerging economies, there 
is an even stronger case for adopting centrally imposed fiscal rules because they start 
outperforming other approaches at substantially lower levels of vertical fiscal imbal-
ance, and their marginal effect grows faster as vertical fiscal imbalances widen.15
Finally, because the construction of the bailout history dummy in many cases 
relies on subjective individual opinions about the purpose of intergovernmental 
transfers and the ways in which they are allocated, we estimated equation (1) omit-
ting the bailout history variable (bailout). The results presented in Appendix Table 
A.4 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.
Potential Endogeneity of Subnational Borrowing Controls
The between estimates presented in Figure 1 could be biased if subnational borrow-
ing controls were not strictly exogenous. Although subnational borrowing regimes 
influence average subnational fiscal outcomes, the latter could, in turn, affect the 
choice of subnational borrowing regimes. Countries with less disciplined subna-
tional governments may have to adopt stricter rules, whereas countries with more 
14Lack of sufficient observations did not allow inclusion of self-imposed fiscal rules in this analysis.
15The positive marginal effect of centrally imposed fiscal rules in emerging economies is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level whenever vertical fiscal imbalance exceeds 43 percent.disciplined subnational governments could rely on market discipline. The fact that 
most countries chose subnational borrowing controls before the period under con-
sideration, and hence the average subnational fiscal balances could not directly 
affect the choice, partly alleviates the potential endogeneity problem that arises. 
However, concerns still exist insofar as current average subnational fiscal balances 
tend to correlate with past averages.
A consistent two-stage estimator similar to the two-stage least squares addresses 
the problem of endogeneity. Because the potentially endogenous regressors are a 
set of mutually exclusive dummies, the first stage is modified to incorporate a mul-
tinomial logit model instead of the usual linear regression. The small sample size 
limited the first-stage regression to be parsimonious, because inclusion of each 
explanatory variable, including a constant, requires four degrees of freedom. The 
preferred specification included the degree of fiscal decentralization, GDP, the 
average fiscal balance of the central government, and a constant. This combination 
of variables has the highest explanatory power for the choice of subnational bor-
rowing regimes, and they can be assumed to be exogenous. In particular, it is 
assumed that fiscal performance at the subnational level does not directly affect 
GDP, average central government fiscal balance, or the extent to which the govern-
ment is decentralized. The results of the first-stage estimation are summarized in 
Appendix Table A.3. The probabilities of adopting each approach estimated in the 
first stage are then used instead of their respective dummy variables in the second 
stage to estimate equation (2).
The results of the second-stage estimation reported in column 2 of Table 2 show 
that the main qualitative findings hold. Figure 3, based on the two-stage estimates, 
looks very similar to Figure 1. However, there are two obvious distinctions. First, the 
horizontal axis has “plunged,” implying that unrestricted subnational borrowing   
is associated now with inferior subnational fiscal outcomes, relative to any other 
approach (except cooperative when vertical fiscal imbalance is high). Second, the 
positive marginal impact of cooperative arrangements decreases when vertical fiscal 
imbalances widen. Both observations imply that countries that do not impose limits 


































Figure 2.  Marginal Effect of Centrally Imposed Rules on Average Subnational 





































Figure 3.  Marginal Effect of Different Subnational Borrowing Controls  
on Average Subnational Fiscal Balance (IV Estimates)
on subnational borrowing or that opt for a cooperative approach have intrinsically 
more disciplined subnational governments, whereas countries with intrinsically less 
disciplined subnational governments opt for fiscal rules or administrative controls.16
III.  Conclusions and Recommendations
Assessing the impact of an institutional framework on fiscal outcomes is a challeng-
ing task. The institutional framework governing intergovernmental fiscal relations 
is complex, and classifying countries often requires a judgment call. Some coun-
tries may be using several institutional features simultaneously; others may opt for 
different institutional mechanisms over time. In addition, other institutional char-
acteristics that also affect fiscal policy may accompany the adoption of a specific 
fiscal framework, and disentangling these effects is difficult. The use of a broad 
range of controls (see Appendix Tables A.2 and A.4) and instrumental variables 
alleviates self-selection and endogeneity problems, but does not remove them 
entirely. Methods of controlling for self-selection, either semiparametric (propen-
sity score–based) or parametric (Heckman’s estimator), are unfortunately very 
demanding in terms of degrees of freedom, particularly in the presence of endog-
enous variables, and could not be performed on the available sample. Nevertheless, 
the empirical results presented in this paper suggest some broad conclusions:
•  No single institutional arrangement seems to be superior to all the others under all 
circumstances. The appropriateness of any given borrowing constraint requires 
assessment in light of other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of 
vertical fiscal imbalances, the existence of any bailout precedents, and the quality 
of fiscal reporting.
16As can be seen from Table 2, the statistical significance of the IV estimates is low. Consequently, all 
confidence areas corresponding to the lines of Figure 3 overlap. Countries with self-imposed rules were 
removed from the sample owing to an insufficient number of observations.hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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•  Giving  unconstrained  borrowing  authority  to  subnational  governments  is 
unlikely to be an optimal solution. At low levels of vertical fiscal imbalances, 
fiscal rules adopted by subnational governments themselves seem to lead to 
better fiscal outcomes.
•  As vertical fiscal imbalances widen, however, the positive effect of self-imposed 
rules declines rapidly, and centrally imposed fiscal rules seem to become the best 
option, especially in emerging economies.
•  For high vertical imbalances, although administrative procedures may provide the 
central government with even tighter control over subnational government fiscal 
outcomes (compared with both fiscal rules and cooperative arrangements), the 
implicit guarantee of subnational debt related to these controls seems to under-
mine fiscal discipline in the long run.
•  The adoption of common standards of financial reporting is crucial for the success 
of cooperative arrangements and may increase the effectiveness of centrally 
imposed fiscal rules.
Fiscal rules may take a wide variety of forms, however. As already discussed, 
some rules establish a debt ceiling or target fiscal deficit, and others cap expendi-
ture. Coverage differs also. In addition, borrowing constraints may be enforced in 
different ways. In some countries, it is left to financial markets to sanction fiscally 
undisciplined local governments. Other countries support a more cooperative 
approach, whereby subnational governments agree to impose administrative as well 
as financial sanctions and penalties among themselves. Higher levels of govern-
ment can also retain the right to punish subnational governments for noncompli-
ance. Some countries have even adopted bankruptcy procedures for subnational 
governments in case of a crisis, in order to avoid bailouts and achieve a more trans-
parent resolution process. Finally, transfer systems may take various forms, and a 
given  level  of  vertical  fiscal  imbalance  might  capture  different  incentives. 
Constrained by data availability, this paper could not deal with the interactions of 
these important institutional features and leaves this to future research.
APPENDIx: DATA SOURCES
The data set was compiled using the following sources:
Data on central and subnational government budgets: IMF, Government Finance Statistics 
(2002).
Macroeconomic indicators: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2004).
Subnational jurisdictions structure: World Bank (2000), Table A.1.
Corruption perception indices: Transparency International.
Political indicators, election years: World Bank Database of Political Indicators (2000).
Federal/unitary country: Classification developed by Treisman (2002).
Index of horizontal imbalances: Data from Rodden and Wibbels (2002), Table 2.
Data on the standards of budgeting and financial reporting: OECD (2003).
Central bank independence index: Cukierman (1992).
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization: Roeder (2001). The index measures the probability that two 
randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnolinguistic groups.
Data on Russia: Statistical Yearbook of Russia (2003), Goskomstat, Moscow (Rossiyskiy 
Statisticheskiy Ezhegodnik 2003).
Data on India: Purfield (2004).Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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Table A.1.  Subnational Borrowing Controls Across the World
    Bailout  
Country  Regime  History  Years  Sources
Argentina  Self-imposed   Yes  1993–2000  Webb (2003); Braun and Tommasi  
  rules            (2004); Schwartz and Liuksila 
(1997); Rezk (1998); IDB (1997)
Australia  Cooperative  Yes  1982–2000    Robinson (2001); Craig (1997);  
  von Hagen and others (2000)
Austria 1  Central rule  No  1982–98
Austria 2  Cooperative  No  1999–2000  Thöni, Garbislander, and Haas (2002)
Belgium  Cooperative  No  1982–98    Bogaert and Père (2001); Vanneste  
  (2002)
Bolivia  Administrative  No  1986–2000    MacKenzie and Ruiz (1997); IDB  
  (1997)
Brazil 1  Administrative  Yes  1989–94
Brazil 2  Central rule  Yes  1997–98  Rodden (2003a); Ter-Minassian  
            (1997a); IDB (1997)
Canada   Central rule  No  1985–2000 
    (local)
Canada   Unrestricted  Yes  1982–2000  Bird and Tassonyi (2003); Krelove,  
    (provinces)          Stotsky, and Vehorn (1997)
Chile  Administrative  Yes  1983–2000  IDB (1997), UNCTAD (2002)
Colombia  Central rule  Yes  1982–86    Ahmad and Baer (1997); Bird and  
    Fiszbein (1998); IDB (1997); 
UNCTAD (2002)
Croatia  Unrestricted  No  1994–2000  Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002)
Czech   Unrestricted  No  1993–2000  Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002); 
  Republic          OECD (2000)
Denmark  Cooperative  No  1982–2000  Jørgen and Pedersen (2002)
Estonia  Central rule  No  1991–2000    Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002);  
  OECD (2000)
Finland  Unrestricted  No  1982–98    Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997);  
  OECD (2003)
France  Unrestricted  Yes  1982–87    Gilbert and Guengant (2002);  
  UNCTAD (2002)
Germany 1  Central rule  Yes  1982–91    Wurzel (1999); Wendorff (2001);  
    Rodden (2003b); von Hagen and 
others (2000)
Germany 2  Cooperative  Yes  1992–98
Guatemala  Administrative  No  1990–93  IDB (1997)
Hungary 1  Unrestricted  Yes  1982–95   
Hungary 2  Central rule  Yes  1996–2000    Wetzel and Papp (2003); Lutz and 
  others (1997); OECD (2000)
Iceland  Unrestricted  No  1983–98  OECD (2003)
India 1  Administrative  Yes  1982–98
India 2  Cooperative  Yes  1999–2000  McCarten (2003); Purfield (2004)
Indonesia  Administrative  Yes  1982–93  Shah (1998); Lewis (2003)
Ireland  Administrative  Yes  1989–97    Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997);  
  OECD (2003)
Israel  Administrative  No  1988–2000  Hecht (1988)
(continued)hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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Table A.1  (concluded)
    Bailout  
Country  Regime  History  Years  Sources
Italy  Central rule  Yes  1985–99    Fraschini (2002); von Hagen and  
    others (2000)
Latvia  Administrative  Yes  1994–2000    Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002);  
    OECD (2000)
Lithuania  Central rule  No  1993–2000    Dabla-Norris and Wade (2002);  
    OECD (2000)
Mexico  Administrative  Yes  1982–2000  Amieva-Huerta (1997); IDB (1997)
Netherlands  Unrestricted  Yes  1982–97    Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997);  
    OECD (2003)
New   Unrestricted  No  1992–2000  OECD (2003) 
  Zealand
Nigeria  Unrestricted  No  1995–2000  Mered (1997)
Norway  Central rule  No  1982–99    Borge and Rattsø (2002);  
    Rattsø (2003)
Peru  Administrative  No  1991–2000  IDB (1997)
Philippines  Administrative  No  1982–91  Petersen (2001)
Portugal  Unrestricted  No  1987–98    Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997);  
    OECD (2003)
Russia  Unrestricted  Yes  1995–2000    Craig, Norregaard, and Tsibouris  
      (1997); Dabla-Norris and Wade 
(2002)
Slovak   Central rule  No  1996–2000  OECD (2003) 
    Republic
South   Cooperative  No  1982–2000  Ahmad (2003); Ahmad (1998) 
   Africa
Spain 1  Central rule  Yes  1982–91    Gordo and de Cos (2001);  
      Monasterio-Escudero and Suárez-
Pandiello (2002)
Spain 2  Cooperative  Yes  1992–97
Sweden  Unrestricted  Yes  1982–99    Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg  
      (2003); von Hagen and others 
(2000)
Switzerland  Self-imposed   No  1982–2000  Dafflon (2002); Spahn (1997) 
      rules
United   Administrative  No  1982–98  Watt (2002); Potter (1997) 
    Kingdom
United   Self-imposed rules  No  1982–2000  Inman (2003); Stotsky and Sunley  
    States            (1997)
Zimbabwe  Administrative  No  1982–91  Helmsing and others (1991)
Note: Data missing for Brazil 1995–96.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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Table A.2.  Statistically Insignificant Control Variables:  
Impact on Subnational Fiscal Balance
Variable  Sign1  Consistent with Prior Expectations?
Federation  +  No
Region-based representation in senate  −  Yes
Perceived corruption  −  Yes
Inflation  −  Yes
Real interest rates  +  Yes
Debt service to gross national income  +  Yes
Unemployment  −  Yes
Political cohesion index  +  Yes
Central bank independence  +  Yes
Elected subnational authorities  +  Yes
Proportion of young and elderly  +  No
Population density  −  No
Horizontal fiscal imbalances  +  No
Area, log  −  n.a.2
Emerging country  −  Yes
Size of jurisdictions (GDP share)  −  Yes
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization  −  Yes
Parliamentary republic  −  Yes
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1+ (−) denotes a positive (negative) but insignificant coefficient.
2There is no prior hypothesis about the effect of area.
Table A.3.  Determinants of Subnational Borrowing Regimes
  1  2  3 
    Centrally  
Regime  Cooperative  Imposed Rules  Administrative
Method    Multinomial logit 
Dependent variable    Subnational borrowing regime 
GDP (log, in US$, PPP terms)  1.007  0.605  −0.985
  (0.939)  (0.684)  (0.645)
Central government surplus to revenue (CS)  −8.628  −1.265  −8.108
  (5.756)  (3.725)*  (4.478)*
Decentralization (dec)  2.961  −8.619  −8.573
  (4.587)  (4.834)*  (4.664)*
Constant  −12.015  −6.299  10.029
  (8.597)  (6.639)  (5.824)*
Number of groups    47
Pseudo R2    0.17
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at the 10 percent level are 
marked with *; at the 5 percent level, with **; at the 1 percent level, with ***.
This table reports the results of the first stage of a two-stage estimation procedure.
The second stage results are reported in Table 2 (column 2).hOw ShOuLD SuBnAtIOnAL GOVERnMEnt BORROwInG BE REGuLAtED?
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Table A.4.  Determinants of Subnational Fiscal Balances:  
Additional Specifications
Model  1  2  3  4 
      Common   Emerging  
(Equation 2)  Linear  IV  Standards  Countries
Method  Between  Two-stage  Between
Dependent variable  Subnational surplus to revenue
Central government surplus (CS)  0.430  0.625  0.466  0.442
  (0.062)***  (0.352)*  (0.122)***  (0.095)***
Decentralization (dec)  −0.062  0.078  −0.004  −0.040
  (0.075)  (0.402)  (0.092)  (0.072)
Self-imposed rule (self)  0.049      0.054
  (0.138)      (0.132)
Centrally imposed rule (central)  −0.055  0.010  −0.070  −0.078
  (0.043)  (0.438)  (0.044)  (0.042)*
Cooperative (coop)  −0.154  0.159  −0.158  −0.161
  (0.064)**  (0.308)  (0.056)***  (0.061)**
Administrative (admin)  −0.006  0.229  −0.025  0.002
  (0.042)  (0.312)  (0.047)  (0.040)
VFI * self  −0.160      −0.216
  (0.597)      (0.570)
VFI * central  0.165  −0.226  0.189  0.146
  (0.093)*  (0.663)  (0.089)**  (0.089)
VFI * coop  0.238  0.328  0.009  0.247
  (0.107)**  (0.476)  (0.140)  (0.103)**
VFI * admin  0.037  0.112  0.047  0.037
  (0.072)  (0.165)  (0.083)  (0.068)
Common standards of PEM      0.171
* coop      (0.065)**
Common standards of PEM      0.013
* central      (0.044)
VFI * central * emerge        0.188
        (0.086)**
GDP (log, in US$, PPP terms)  0.012  0.048  0.003  0.019
  (0.013)  (0.046)  (0.018)  (0.012)
Constant  −0.082  −0.497  −0.013  −0.153
  (0.121)  (0.559)  (0.179)  (0.120)
Number of observations  572  523  425  572
Number of groups  50  47  35  50
R2 (between)  0.55  0.56  0.78  0.61
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Values significant at the 10 percent level are 
marked with *; at the 5 percent level, with **; at the 1 percent level, with ***. VFI is vertical fis-
cal imbalance; PEM is public expenditure management; PPP is purchasing power parity; Emerge 
is emerging market dummy. These specifications are identical to those reported in Table 2, except 
bailout history dummy is excluded.Alexander Plekhanov and Raju Singh
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